On May 22 this year, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang delivered a government work report at the National People's Congress (hereinafter referred to as the "National People's Congress"), in which the Taiwan-related work policy was only 108 words, which was the most concise content in previous sessions, and did not mention "" The 1992 Consensus"; compared with Tsai Ing-wen's second inaugural speech on May 20, he did not recognize the "1992 Consensus", but still claimed to handle cross-strait affairs in accordance with the "Constitution of the Republic of China" and the "Regulations on Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Strait", or there may be optimism It is believed that the CCP's policy towards Taiwan has finally shifted to be closer to the DPP authorities. This is an "olive branch" of goodwill released by the CCP authorities. Cross-strait dialogue and negotiation are no longer based on the common political foundation of the "1992 Consensus", and cross-strait interactions will move towards the "post-92nd consensus". The Era of Two Consensus. However, some commentators believe that although the government work report does not mention the "1992 Consensus", it does not mean giving up; it still mentions "opposing Wedding Photo Editing Taiwan independence" and "promoting reunification", and the nature of cross-strait relations is still "national identity". It is worth noting that the CCP authorities did not reiterate the "1992 Consensus" in the government work report, and Tsai Ing-wen did not respond to the "1992 Consensus" in his 520 inaugural speech. Is this the political goodwill of the authorities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait? Is it not necessary to presuppose "political premise" information to release the cross-strait authorities to resume dialogue? Could this cause the KMT to adjust the cross-strait discourse? The core connotation of the term "1992 Consensus" represents that the nature of the relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is "one country" and "one China". Abandon the "1992 Consensus" and search for the "Cross-Strait Consensus"? First of all, the CCP authorities did not mention the "1992 Consensus" in the government work report, which may impact the willingness of some Kuomintang members to adhere to the "1992 Consensus", causing the Kuomintang to sway in the cross-strait line. Hesitant. For example, Lin Weizhou, the head of the Kuomintang Legislative Yuan, proposed that the "1992 Consensus" has been stigmatized and linked to "One Country, Two Systems". Now, because of the "National Security Law incident" in Hong Kong, "One Country, Two Systems" has no market in Taiwan. The word "two consensus" can no longer be used, and we should describe the current cross-strait situatio